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Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes a Look at
Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit
During the last several years, a "litigation explosion" of civil rights
actions has occurred in the federal courts. Civil rights suits have increased
steadily in proportion to other types of cases and now occupy a substantial
portion of the federal docket.1 To cope with the influx of this litigation,
federal courts have developed methods to terminate cases before the costly
and time-consuming process of trial. Some courts have, for example, ap-
plied a heightened pleading standard to civil rights cases, requiring plain-
tiffs to plead all the elements of their claim with greater particularity and
factual specificity than normally required in civil cases. By the beginning
of 1993, many federal courts had adopted this practice.2 In Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,3 a unanimous
Supreme Court decided that a heightened standard applied to a claim
brought against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contradicted the pur-
pose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was therefore invalid.4
The Court held that Rule 8(a) "meant what it said," and called for more
detail in the pleadings only where expressly enumerated.5
This Note first recounts the facts and holding in Leatherman.6 The
Note then examines the Court's reasoning in light of other § 1983 deci-
sions, particularly those in which immunity defenses were involved.7 After
analyzing the merits of a heightened pleading standard, this Note discusses
the confusion courts have experienced in deciding what facts a plaintiff
must allege to substantiate a § 1983 claim and how they have used other
means to dispose of such cases.' Concluding that post-Leatherman courts
must resort to summary judgment and discovery control under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when dealing with § 1983 actions, this Note ar-
1. Although only 270 federal civil rights actions were filed in 1961, more than 30,000
§ 1983 actions were commenced in 1981. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
2. See infra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
3. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
4. Id. at 1161.
5. Id at 1163.
6. See infra notes 11-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 47-108 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 109-61 and accompanying text.
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gues that the proper use of these procedures is a fair means of sifting
through claims while still conserving judicial resources.'
Section 1983 gives an express cause of action to persons whose civil
rights have been violated by an official acting under color of state law.10 At
issue in Leatherman were the actions of police officers during two drug
raids.1 ' In the first raid, police officers, acting on a tip, searched the house
of Gerald Andert on January 30, 1989.12 Andert and his family, who were
at home, were forced to lie face down on the floor for ninety minutes while
the officers conducted their search.' 3 During the search, an unidentified
officer inflicted a head wound on Andert that required eleven stitches to
close.'4 Not finding evidence of any criminal activity, the officers aban-
doned their search, allegedly without any apology to the family.1
The second search at issue in Leatherman occurred on May 20, 1989,
while Charlene Leatherman and her son were away from their home.16 Po-
lice officers stopped the Leatherman's car a few blocks from the house to
inform them that their house was being searched and that their two dogs had
been shot. 7 When Leatherman asked why the dogs had been shot, she
reportedly was told that this was "standard procedure."' 8
Andert and Leatherman brought suits against the county, two munici-
pal corporations, and several county officials under § 1983.11 The plaintiffs
9. See infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
10. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
11. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 954 F.2d 1054, 1056 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
1160 (1993).
12. Id.
13. lL
14. Id. Andert was 64 years old at the time of the raid. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1055.
17. Id. The Leatherman family owned two dogs, Shakespeare and Ninja. Id. Shakespeare
was found dead about 25 feet from the front door of the Leatherman house, and had been shot
three times. Id. Ninja was found dead on the bed in the master bedroom and apparently had been
killed by a close range shotgun blast to the head. Md.
18. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Leatherman v. Tan-ant County, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (No.
91-1657). The warrants in both cases were issued after police detected odors associated with the
manufacture of drugs coming from the house. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1161.
19. The defendants named in the suit were the Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, Tarrant County, Texas; Tim Curry, in his official capacity as director of the
Tarrant County Narcotics and Coordination Unit; Don Carpenter; City of Lake Worth, Texas; and
City of Grapevine, Texas.
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alleged that the officers had deprived them of their constitutional rights and
that the municipal corporations were liable because of their failure to pro-
vide adequate training for the officers." ° The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the complaint because it failed
to meet the "heightened pleading standard" used by courts in the Fifth Cir-
cuit,21 and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.22 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the Courts of
Appeals concerning the applicability of a heightened pleading standard to
§ 1983 actions alleging municipal liability."'23
In holding that heightened pleading standards were not required for
§ 1983 actions, the Leatherman Court first addressed the respondent's con-
tention that a municipality's freedom from respondeat superior liability nec-
essarily implies immunity from suit.24 Rejecting an argument that a more
relaxed pleading requirement would expose municipalities to needless dis-
covery in § 1983 suits, the Court found that although a municipality is free
from respondeat superior liability, it does not enjoy complete immunity
from suit. 5 For example, the Court noted that municipalities do not enjoy
the qualified-or "good faith"-immunity accorded public officials.26 The
Court also observed that Leatherman provided "no occasion to consider
whether our qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened
pleading in cases involving individual government officials."'27
20. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 755 F. Supp. 726, 728-29 (N.D. Tex. 1991), affd, 954
F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993); see also infra note 51 (explaining that a
municipality could be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from a failure to
train its employees).
21. Leatherman, 755 F.2d at 734. The court held that the plaintiff's complaint did not con-
tain the specificity required for § 1983 suits. Il at 730. The court characterized the allegations as
"blunderbuss" in nature and stated that the complaint failed to provide any specific evidence as to
how the defendant had failed to "formulate and implement an adequate policy to train its officers
on the Constitutional limitations restricting the manner in which search warrants may be exe-
cuted.' Id. The allegations that the officer's conduct represented a policy or custom for which the
defendant municipality could be held liable were also dismissed for the same reasons. Id. at 731.
22. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 954 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
1160 (1993). The court noted that "the heightened pleading requirement governs all section 1983
complaints brought in this circuit: If the complaint is all bark and no bite, a district court is
constrained to dismiss it even before opening discovery." Id. In a separate opinion, Judge
Goldberg recognized the logic of the plaintiff's argument that heightened pleading standards
should not be imposed in § 1983 suits against municipalities, but concluded that in the absence of
an intervening Supreme Court decision, the court must "decline their invitation to reexamine the
wisdom of this circuit's heightened pleading requirement." Id- at 1061 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
23. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1161.
24. Id. at 1162. Respondeat superior is the tort doctrine that allows one person, such as an
employer, to be held liable for the negligence of another, such as an employee. See W. PAGE
KETroN r AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTs § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984).
25. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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The respondent's second contention was that the "heightened pleading
requirement" was misnamed and actually required no more factual specific-
ity than called for by the complexity of the background law.28 The respon-
dents justified their position by claiming that the degree of specificity was
consistent with the plaintiff's duty to make a reasonable fact-finding effort
under Rule 11.29 Despite these arguments, the Court held that the Fifth
Circuit's heightened pleading standard was what it seemed: "a more de-
manding rule for pleading a complaint under § 1983 than for pleading other
kinds of claims for relief."'30 The opinion cited to the standard adopted by
the Fifth Circuit: "In cases against government officials involving the
likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that
the plaintiff's complaints state with factual detail and particularity the basis
for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot
successfully maintain the defense of immunity." 31
The Court unanimously held that this standard is incompatible with the
"notice pleading" system of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."2 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, acknowledged the "liberal system
of 'notice pleading' " by referring to Rule 8(a)(2), which merely requires
that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief. '33  The Court then elaborated on its
own interpretation of the Rules:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the
contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of
the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.34
28. Id. In its brief to the United States Supreme Court, respondent Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit argued that "a court [must] evaluate the factual sufficiency of
a complaint in the context of the applicable rules of law." Brief for Respondents Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit et al. at 9-10, Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993)
(No. 91-1657). The respondents cited several cases of different contexts in which a heightened
standard was arguably required. See Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331, 2337 (1991) (holding that a
complaint must clearly allege facts which establish that the plaintiff has standing to bring a claim);
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
528 n.17 (1983) (stating that district court must retain power to insist on specific pleading in large
antitrust case).
29. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162; see infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
30. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162-63.
31. Id. (citing Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)); see infra notes 85-97
and accompanying text.
32. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162-63.
33. Id.; see FaD. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
34. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162-63 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))
(footnote omitted); see also infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
reliance on Conley).
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Relying on Conley v. Gibson,35 the Leatherman Court affirmed its ear-
lier ruling that "the Rule meant what it said."36 The Court further reasoned
that because Rule 9(b) requires greater particularity for pleadings alleging
fraud or mistake, but makes no mention of other situations, applying a
heightened pleading standard to additional types of claims is inappropri-
ate.37 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded by remarking that if the Rules
were rewritten, perhaps a heightened pleading standard would be appropri-
ate in these types of suits.3"
Section 1983, the federal statute the Leatherman plaintiffs relied upon
to bring their suit, has been used extensively by civil rights plaintiffs.3 9
Congress originally enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and intended the statute to provide a federal remedy for
the deprivation of civil rights by state and local governments.4' The Court
has interpreted § 1983 to apply to a broad range of situations, many of
which were probably not contemplated by the drafters of the statute.41 Gen-
erally, a § 1983 claim is composed of four elements: (1) a violation of
35. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). The petitioners in Conley were members of a railway union who
sought to compel the union to fairly represent them. The respondent argued for dismissal on
several grounds, including the failure of the petitioner's complaint to allege specific acts of dis-
crimination. Id at 47. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the criteria suggested by the
respondent went beyond that requested by the Federal Rules. Id. at 47-48.
36. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
37. Id. Rule 9(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances consti-
tuting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
38. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. Chief Justice Rehnquist's exact words were: "[C]laims
against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of
Rule 9(b)." Id. That Chief Justice Rehnquist only mentions this particular type of action lends
credence to the notion that Leatherman is limited to this particular set of facts. See infra notes
129-30 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
40. MARTIN A. ScHwARTZ & JoHN E. KnuLiN, SECrION 1983 LrrGAnON: CLAmis, Da-
FE~s~, AND FEES § 1.2, at 6 (1st ed. 1986). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was titled
"An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other purposes." The most pressing reason for the statute's enactment was the
activity of the Ku Klux Klan, although Section 1 "was not a remedy against [the Klan] or its
members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to
enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961). For further discussion of
Monroe, see infra note 50.
41. As the Court noted in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685
(1978), § 1983 should be construed "to give a broad remedy for violations of federally protected
civil rights." For a further discussion of Monell, see infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
The Court has discussed the legislative history of § 1983 in several civil rights cases. See, e.g.,
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The legislative history of § 1983, however, is often of little help in
determining the boundaries of a § 1983 action. As one commentator has observed:
[Tihe legislative history of section 1983 is, in the main, unhelpful. Given the passions
raised by Reconstruction and the breadth of the issues addressed, few lawyers are unable
to find support for their position in those turbulent decades.... Although most opinions
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rights protected by the federal constitution or other federal law (2) proxi-
mately caused (3) by a "person" (4) who acted under color of a statute,
regulation, custom, or usage of any state, territory, or district.
42
In conjunction with the liability imposed by § 1983 the Court has
found "immunity" from liability to exist when it is compatible with the
purposes of § 1983, and when such immunity was firmly established at the
time the statute was enacted.43 The immunity doctrine is an attempt to en-
sure that governmental affairs are carried out without fear of liability. Offi-
cials in particularly sensitive positions enjoy "absolute immunity," or
complete protection from suit arising from acts performed in their official
capacities.' Other governmental entities that require a lesser degree of
protection have been given "qualified" or "good faith" immunity. 5 Under
this standard, officials are shielded from civil liability as long as their con-
duct did not violate clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person knew or should have known.46
As the Leathennan Court noted, the Court's decision in Monell v. New
York City Department of Social Services led to an increase in § 1983 ac-
tions; this increase in the number of cases prompted many courts to create
the heightened pleading standard.4 7 The Monell plaintiffs were female em-
ployees of the City of New York.4" They brought a § 1983 suit alleging
that the defendants had, as a matter of official policy, compelled pregnant
employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were medi-
still mention the legislative history of section 1983, such references are, in large mea-
sure, ceremonial.
Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 601, 605, 607 (1985). The wide availability of judicial discretion in interpreting
§ 1983 has allowed the statute to "burst its historical bounds." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
554 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
42. SCHWAR-Z & KIRKLIN, supra note 40, § 1.3, at 8.
43. Id. § 7.1, at 142; see also Procanier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (finding
qualified immunity for prison officials and officers); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 404, 430
(1976) (finding absolute immunity for prosecutors in initiating and presenting the state's case);
Pierson v. Ray, 388 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (holding that judges are immune from liability for acts
committed within their judicial discretion).
44. Article I of the United States Constitution grants absolute immunity to federal legislators.
U. S. CoNsT. art I, § 6, c. 1. Other government officials also enjoy absolute immunity. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 404, 430 (1976) (prosecutors); Tenney v. Broundhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372
(1951) (state legislators); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872) (judges).
45. See Peter H. Schuk, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public
Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. Ray. 281, 281-85.
46. Id. at 283-85.
47. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Leatherman, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[tihe phenom-
enon of litigation against municipal corporations based on claimed constitutional violations by
their empl6yees dates from our decision in Monell, where we for the first time construed § 1983 to
allow such municipal liability." Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
48. Monell, 436 U.S. at 658.
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cally necessary.49 After reviewing the legislative history of § 1983, the
Court reversed its previous holding in Monroe v. Pape that the Act did not
impose civil liability on municipalities.5 0 The Monell Court held that the
Congress of 1871 intended for the municipality to be considered a constitu-
tional "person" under § 1983; therefore, city governments could be sued
directly for violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights stemming from an
action or custom of the municipality. 5 ' A municipality could not be held
.liable, however, under a theory of respondeat superior. 2 The Court noted
that imposing too much liability upon a municipality could impair its ability
to govern and lead to unnecessary expense, and therefore, only a compel-
ling reason could lead to the imposition of vicarious liability. 3 The Court
found that Congress did not consider the two main justifications for respon-
deat superior-placing the loss on the best cost-avoider and risk spread-
ing-compelling enough to impose such liability on municipalities under
§ 1983.14 Therefore, the Court held that liability under § 1983 can only be
imposed when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible [for] under § 1983."'1
Two years later, the Court further elaborated on the scope of municipal
immunity from § 1983 actions in Owen v. City of Independence.56 It deter-
mined that municipal corporations do not enjoy the qualified immunity ex-
tended to individual officials acting in their official capacities. 7 The Court
49. The plaintiffs brought a class action against the Department of Social Services and its
commissioner, the Board and its chancellor, as well as the City of New York and its mayor.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 661.
50. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Although the decision in Monroe established
§ 1983 as a remedy against the actions of police officers, it stopped short of allowing plaintiffs to
pursue an action against the local government controlling the officers. Id. at 187-90. After scruti-
nizing the congressional debate on the 1871 Act from which § 1983 sprang, the Court concluded
that the legislators had not intended for city governments or other municipalities to be regarded as
"persons" under the Act. Id. at 187-92.
51. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. The Court's decision in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378
(1989), established that a municipality could be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations
stemming from a failure to train its employees. Id. at 385-92. The Leatherman plaintiffs relied on
Canton for the basis of their claims. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 755 F. Supp. 726, 730 (N.D.
Tex. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
52. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see also supra note 24 (defining respondeat superior).
53. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-94.
54. The Court found that some lawmakers had raised these justifications during the 1871
debate, yet Congress failed to sustain them. The Court reasoned that Congress rejected these
justifications because it was unwilling to impose federal liability upon municipalities without a
strong showing of causation. Monell, 436 U.S at 693 n.57.
55. Id. at 694.
56. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
57. Id. at 638; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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analyzed the question of whether an entity was entitled to immunity in a
§ 1983 action by examining the common-law tradition and asking if the
tradition was still supported by public policy reasons."8 If so, then the
Court assumed that "Congress would have specifically so provided had it
wished to abolish the doctrine."5 9 Because "there is no tradition of immu-
nity for municipal corporations," the Court held that a municipality may not
assert the good faith of their officers or agents as a defense to liability under
§ 1983.60
The Owen Court listed several reasons for not extending qualified im-
munity to municipalities. First, the opinion distinguished the interests in-
volved in suits against individual government officials from those brought
against municipalities.61 When individual officials are concerned, the Court
noted, immunity insulates them from personal liability.62 That concern is
not present in an action against a municipality because "only the liability of
the municipality itself is at issue, not that of its officers, and in the absence
of an immunity, any recovery would come from public funds. ' 6 The
Court's second rationale for not extending qualified immunity to municipal-
ities focused on fairness.' Although the Court explained that it is arguably
unjust to hold a well-intentioned official liable for a civil rights violation, it
reasoned that there is no injustice in forcing a municipality to bear the loss
for which it was responsible.6 1 Whereas liability might preclude an individ-
ual official from effectively carrying out his duties, the same is not true if
liability is imposed on a municipality.6 6 In fact, the Court stated that con-
58. Owen, 445 U.S. at 637.
59. Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).
60. Id. at 638.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 638 n.18.
63. Id. The Owen Court referred to several instances in which it had held that "different
considerations come into play when governmental rather than personal liability is threatened." Id.
at 653 n.37. The Court cited Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), and Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975), for the proposition that "imposing personal liability on public officials could
have an undue chilling effect on the exercise of their decision-making responsibilities, but that no
such pernicious consequences were likely to flow from the possibility of a recovery from public
funds." 445 U.S. at 653 n.37 (emphasis added). As additional support, the Owen Court cited
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), which
found that government officials were not liable to the plaintiffs because of qualified immunity, but
the municipal agency itself was held liable. Owen, 444 U.S. at 653 n.37. The Court stated that
"the justifications for immunizing officials from personal liability have little force when suit is
brought against the governmental entity itself." Id.
64. Owen, 445 U.S. at 655.
65. The Court reasoned that "even where some constitutional development could not have
been foreseen by municipal officials, it is fairer to allocate any resulting financial loss to the
inevitable costs of government borne by all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to be felt solely
by those whose rights ... have been violated." Id.
66. id. at 656.
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cern over the consequences of a municipal policy, including possible liabil-
ity, is properly within the scope of consideration of policy-makers.67 An
official's concern over the liability of a municipality should not have the
same debilitating effect that it would have were the liability personal.68 The
Court also reasoned that granting municipalities a defense of qualified im-
munity would frustrate public policy. Noting that one of the purposes of
the Civil Rights Act is to protect citizens from the abuses of state power, the
Court stated: "[O]wing to the qualified immunity enjoyed by most govern-
ment officials .... many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left
remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith defense. Un-
less countervailing considerations counsel otherwise, the injustice of such a
result should not be tolerated. 69
Harlow v. Fitzgerald° offered the Court its first opportunity to ex-
amine the immunity doctrine in the context of the need to conserve judicial
resources. In that case, the Court considered whether two former presiden-
tial aides were entitled to a defense of absolute immunity.7 1 Holding that
they were only entitled to qualified, or "good faith" immunity, the Court
analyzed the conflicting values the immunity doctrine seeks to preserve.72
The pre-Harlow qualified immunity standard consisted of an objective and
a subjective element?.3 However, the Court recognized that:
[t]he subjective element of the good faith defense frequently has
proved incompatible with our admonition ... that insubstantial
claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
67. ld The Court noted: "The municipality's liability for constitutional violations is quite
properly the concern of its elected or appointed officials." Id
68. The Court reasoned: "[I]t is questionable whether the hazard of municipal loss will deter
a public officer from the conscientious exercise of his duties; city officials routinely make deci-
sions that either require a large expenditure of municipal funds or involve a substantial risk of
depleting the public fisc." Id. (citations omitted). Another reason the Court gave was that
although extending qualified immunity to officials helped encourage good candidates to seek of-
fice, no such purpose would be served if the immunity were extended to municipalities. Id. at 656
n.40 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975)).
69. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
70. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
71. Id. at 801.
72. Id. at 810-15.
73. Id. "Decisions of this Court have established that the 'good faith' defense has both an
'objective' and a 'subjective' aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of
and respect for 'basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.' The subjective component refers to
'permissible intentions."' Id. at 815 (citations omitted). The Court defined these elements by
using a negative proposition:
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified
immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury."
Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 302, 322 (1975)).
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of Civil Procedure provides that disputed questions of fact ordina-
rily may not be decided on motions for summary judgment. And
an official's subjective good faith has been considered to be a
question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently re-
quiring resolution by a jury.74
The Court found that the "subjective" element of the immunity defense
prevented courts from quickly disposing of insubstantial claims; conse-
quently, the Harlow Court changed the standard of pleading relevant to the
"subjective" element so that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice
to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens
of broad reaching discovery."'75 The pleading requirements for a § 1983
action involving qualified immunity were thus distinctly weighted in favor
of the defendant. Until the plaintiff proved that the immunity defense did
not apply, discovery would not be allowed.76 Harlow therfore appeared to
approve of tougher pleading requirements for plaintiffs bringing suit against
officials claiming qualified immunity.
Heightened pleading standards with respect to certain types of actions
have existed for some time, and in some specific circumstances, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure even mandate them.77 Even before the
post-Monell "deluge" of § 1983 actions, courts had dismissed civil rights
complaints for non-specific pleading.78 Most commentators point to Valley
74. Id. at 815-16. Harlow referred to an earlier decision as emphasizing "our expectation
that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial," saying:
Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibili-
ties of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief .... it
should not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheuer that
damages suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be
terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense
of immunity .... In responding to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the
manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that
federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits.
Id. at 808 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978)) (citations omitted); see also
infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing analysis of Harlow in later decisions).
75. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
76. Id. at 818. The immunity defense could be defeated by showing that the officials' con-
duct had violated "clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Id. (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). The Court meant for this requirement to serve as a hurdle before
access to the litigation process is given. "Until this threshold immunity question is resolved,
discovery should not be allowed." Id.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see supra note 37.
78. Even before civil rights actions became widespread, courts used a heightened pleading
standard to dismiss such claims. See, e.g., Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967)
(dismissing complaint against police for being too conclusory); Powell v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964) (dismissing §§ 1983 and 1985 claims for not alleging
deliberate acts on the part of the defendant).
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v. Maule79 as the origin of a heightened pleading standard specifically for
civil rights cases, and many courts followed the Valley rationale, imposing
their own heightened standards."0 In Valley, the court dismissed the plain-
tiff's claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 for lack of sufficient factual allega-
tions to substantiate his claims of wrongdoing by the defendants.8 ' The
court then held that the complaint was subject to a special pleading rule for
civil rights cases, even though it passed the notice pleading standard.8 2 "As
a general rule notice pleading is sufficient, but an exception has been cre-
ated for cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts."8 3 The Valley court
went on to state:
In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of
cases brought under the Civil Rights Act. A substantial number
of these cases are frivolous or should be litigated in the State
courts; they all cause defendants-public officials, policemen and
citizens alike-considerable expense, vexation and perhaps un-
founded notoriety. It is an important public policy to weed out
the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litiga-
tion, and still keep the doors of the federal courts open to legiti-
mate claims.84
The particular heightened pleading standard at issue in Leatherman
had its origins in Elliott v. Perez. 5 The Elliott plaintiffs brought separate
actions for damages against a district attorney, his assistant, and a state
district judge, alleging that a conspiracy between the defendants deprived
the plaintiffs of their civil rights.8 6 Two of the defendants successfully
moved to dismiss the claims based 'on their absolute immunity from suits
79. 297 F. Supp. 958 (D. Conn. 1968).
80. See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Require-
ments in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 935, 948-50 (1990); C. Keith Wingate,
A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Fonvard or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L.
REv. 677 (1984).
81. Valley, 297 F. Supp. at 959. The plaintiffs in Valley alleged that the defendants had
conspired to infringe upon their civil rights. Id. The district court found that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions were insufficient and characterized them as "utterly devoid of any factual allegations which
allege overt acts or purposeful deprivation of rights." Id. at 960. The Valley decision therefore
enacted a heightened pleading standard as a response to the increase of civil rights litigation and
justified it primarily on grounds of public policy and judicial efficiency.
82. Id. at 960.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 960-61. According to one commentator, the Valley court justified the heightened
pleading rule on three grounds. First, the court assumed that many civil rights actions are frivo-
lous. Second, the court expressed that many of the actions should be litigated in state, not federal
courts. Third, the court observed that civil rights actions could possibly expose defendants to
"unnecessary harassment and embarrassment." See Blaze, supra note 80, at 950.
85. 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
86. Id. at 1474-75.
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for damages as judges and prosecutors.8 7 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that "the absolute constitutional tort immunity accorded to some
government officials requires the trial judge to demand heightened stan-
dards of pleading by plaintiffs in cases in which that doctrine is going to
come into play.""8 Noting that "[t]he blunderbuss phrasing of the arguable
claims in the plaintiff's complaints... presents this Court initially with an
issue which goes to the heart of the 'immunity' from damage suits long
accorded certain government officials," the court analyzed the policies sup-
porting a heightened pleading standard in actions involving immunity
defenses.8 9
The Elliott court discussed in detail how Harlow v. Fitzgerald con-
trasted the concerns of the immunity doctrine with the need to let meritori-
ous claims proceed.90 The court also noted there was a substantial
interest-beyond the traditional interest in providing freedom from dam-
ages-in protecting government officials from having to defend against
damage claims:
[I]t now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the
subjective good faith of government officials. [There are] the
general costs of subjecting officials to the risk of trial-distrac-
tion of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of dis-
cretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public
service .... Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore
may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numer-
ous persons, including an official's professional colleagues. In-
87. Id. at 1476.
88. Id. at 1473. The court's opinion went so far as to point out that "[iln the now familiar
cases invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not
merely conclusory allegations." Id. at 1479.
In Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514,516 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit utilized
the rule formulated in Elliott in a § 1983 action against a municipality. Although Palmer repre-
sents the first time the Fifth Circuit used a heightened pleading standard in a case involving a
§ 1983 suit against a municipal corporation, it was arguably not the first time the Fifth Circuit had
used the standard in a § 1983 case. See, e.g., Parish v. N.C.A.A., 566 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (5th
Cir. 1978) ("Conclusory allegations, however, are no substitute for a factual showing of actual
discriminatory intent or effect."); Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The
applicant must set forth specific facts that would, if proved, warrant the relief he seeks.") (empha-
sis added).
89. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1476. The relevant passages of the complaint were quoted in the
opinion:
[Tihe defendants PEREZ, KLEIN and LEON conspired to deter by force, intimidation
or threat through the criminal prosecution of complainant and improper discharge of
the special grand jury to influence the verdict, presentment and indictment of the special
grand jury and specifically [plaintiff Elliott] as foreman of the special grand jury and to
injure complainant in his person and property ....
Id.
90. Il at 1473-76.
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quiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.9 '
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because the Supreme Court, through
Harlow, had decided that defendants entitled to official immunity "should
be free not only from ultimate liability, but also from trial, and the oft-time
overwhelming preliminaries of modem litigation,"92 then those officials
would be exempt from trial and trial preparation until a showing was made
that the immunity doctrine would not apply.93
The Elliott court stated the equation from the standpoint of the immu-
nity doctrine, reasoning that because immunity constitutes a substantive
right, the Enabling Act precluded the Rules from abridging or modifying
it.94 The court found substantial authority within the Rules for the exclu-
sion of frivolous complaints. 95 First, the court described the recently
amended Rule 11 as a provision requiring a more intense pre-filing inquiry
into the facts that would lead to greater specificity in complaints, as well as
encouraging courts to take a more active role in managing the litigation.
96
Second, the Court found that a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite state-
ment allowed courts the authority to require detailed facts from a plaintiff to
support the contention that the immunity defense could not be sustained.97
91. Id. at 1477-78 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-817 (1982)).
92. Id. at 1478.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Rules Enabling Act provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The Elliott court
reasoned that official immunity was enough of a substantive right to preclude the notice pleading
standard of Rule 8(a) from compromising it. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479.
95. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1480-82.
96. Id. Rule 11 provides that the "signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
the signer that the signer has read the pleading ... [and] that to the best of the signer's knowl-
edge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact." FED R.
Civ. P. 11. The Elliott court elaborated that "[t]his means also that having a good faith belief, he
is able to state with some particularity what those facts are." Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1481-82.
97. Id. at 1482. Rule 12(e) reads in pertinent part: "If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame
a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a
responsive pleading." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The Elliott court found precedent for such an inter-
pretation of Rule 12(e) in its decision in Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1976), which
approved a district court's use of a questionnaire to flesh out pro se prisoner complaints.
However, not all the judges on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals thought that a heightened
pleading standard was the best means to accomplish their goal. In his special concurrence, Judge
Higginbotham wrote, "I do not know where we find the authority to add the requirement that
claims against officials who enjoy immunity from suit shall be plead with particularity." Id. at
1483 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Judge Higginbotham advocated changing the requirements
of the cause of action to include a statement of sufficient facts which, if true, would demonstrate
the absence of immunity. Id. This solution would, however, simply create a different pleading
requirement for summary judgment. In any case, Judge Higginbotham at least thought it to be
more in accord with the spirit of the Rules. "It does no violence to notice pleading to suggest that
the adequacy of a pleading is case specific." Id. (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
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Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department8 illustrates the con-
fusion among the circuit courts concerning heightened pleading standards.
In Karim-Panahi, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a pro se
§ 1983 complaint that was dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion.99 Employing an
approach different from that used by the Fifth Circuit in Elliott, the
Karim-Panahi court stated: "In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability
under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss 'even if the
claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual
officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice."' 100 It
seems unlikely that the claim in Karim-Panahi could have withstood the
heightened standard employed by the Fifth Circuit in Elliott, which required
far more than "conclusory allegations." 10'
In Siegert v. Gilley, 2 the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to
resolve the confusion among the lower federal courts as to heightened
pleading standards. The plaintiff brought suit against his former supervisor,
alleging that the supervisor infringed his "liberty interests" in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' Gilley filed a motion
to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity among his defenses."w The court
of appeals found that Siegert's claims were insufficient to overcome its
heightened pleading standard for cases involving qualified immunity de-
fenses."0 5 Yet the Supreme Court declined to comment on the heightened
pleading standard and instead held that Siegert's claim failed to state a vio-
98. 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988). Leathennan made reference to Karim-Panahi for this very
purpose. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1161-62 (1993).
99. Karim-Pahani, 839 F.2d at 623.
100. Id. at 624 (quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986))
(emphasis added).
101. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479; see supra text accompanying note 93.
102. 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
103. Id. at 1792. Petitioner Fredrick Siegert was employed as a clinical psychologist at Fed-
eral Hospital from November 1979 to October 1985. Id. at 1791. After being terminated for his
"inability to report for duty in a dependable and reliable manner," Siegert found work in a United
States Army Hospital in Germany. Id. When Siegert requested that his former supervisor provide
the Army Hospital with information on his job performance, H. Melvin Gilley responded with a
letter characterizing Siegert as inept, unethical, and untrustworthy. Id. As a result, Siegert did not
receive the necessary credentials to continue his work and was terminated from federal service.
Id. Siegert alleged that Gilley's statement had infringed upon his "liberty interests" guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1792.
104. Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1990), affd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct.
1789 (1991). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that "improper motive"
was an essential element of Siegert's claim, and that to defeat a defendant's claim of qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must adequately allege specific evidence of illicit intent. Id. at 802. The
Court of Appeals then decided that Siegert's claims only asserted that Gilley either knew his
statements to be false or gave them in reckless disregard of the truth, and therefore did not satisfy
the heightened standard. Id. at 803-05.
105. Id. at 802.
HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS
lation of any clearly established constitutional right."0 6 Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, however, addressed the lower court's pleading standard:
The heightened pleading standard is a necessary and appropriate
accommodation between the state of mind component of malice
and the objective test that prevails in qualified immunity analysis
in a general manner. There is a tension between the rationale of
Harlow and the requirement of malice, and it seems to me that the
heightened pleading requirement is the most workable means to
resolve it. 07
In striking contrast to Justice Kennedy's defense of the heightened standard,
Justice Marshall's dissent criticized the lower court's requirement: "I find
no warrant for such a rule as a matter of precedent or common sense."'1 8
Siegert, then, left the Court divided on the applicability of heightened
pleading standards, at least when individual officials were concerned.
Leatherman is of enormous practical significance to civil rights plain-
tiffs in particular and the federal judicial system in general. Although
Leatherman's prohibition of heightened pleading standards in § 1983 suits
against municipalities seems clear enough, the true scope of the decision is
difficult to assess. The breadth of Leatherman's ban on heightened plead-
ing standards is unclear. The addition of considerations not present in the
facts of the case, such as the immunity doctrine, might justify the use of a
heightened pleading standard. There is a plausible argument that a height-
ened standard is appropriate in the context of § 1983 suits against munici-
palities, but there is a stronger argument that the policy goals of § 1983
106. Siegert, 111 S. Ct. at 1793-94.
107. Id. at 1795 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy went on to say
that a heightened standard surpassed the Rules' usual requirements but seemed well-suited to
qualified immunity cases:
[A]voidance of disruptive discovery is one of the very purposes for the official immu-
nity doctrine, and it is no answer to say that the plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity
to engage in discovery. The substantive defense of immunity controls.
Upon the assertion of a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff must put forward
specific, nonconclusory factual allegations which establish malice, or face dismissal.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Leatherman did not involve a qualified immunity defense, see 113
S. Ct. at 1162, and the decision was unanimous. The claim of a qualified defense would appear to
be Justice Kennedy's main criterion for the imposition of a more stringent pleading standard.
108. Siegert, 111 S. Ct. at 1801 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was concerned that
the stricter rule might preclude plaintiffs from obtaining through discovery the evidence they
needed to proceed. "Because evidence of such intent is peculiarly within the control of the de-
fendant, the 'heightened pleading' rule employed by the court of appeals effectively precludes any
Bivens action in which the defendant's state of mind is an element of the underlying claim." Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court allowed a private party to bring an action for compensatory dam-
ages under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 397. "A Bivens remedy has become a judicially created
version of a section 1983 remedy, and it relies heavily on traditional common law compensatory
damages rules." KNN= F. Ri'PLE, CONSTITTnIONAL LrrIGATON § 8-4(A), at 327 (1984).
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prevent the use of, the heightened standard."0 9 That the Leatherman deci-
sion was purportedly based on the requirements of the Federal Rules instead
of some of the compelling policy reasons supporting § 1983 actions against
municipalities suggests that the scope of the decision is, in fact, quite
broad.' 10 The justifications of a heightened standard arguably fall short
even in cases involving the immunity doctrine. 1 ' The varied reactions of
lower courts to the Leatherman decision suggest that the Court needs to
clarify what circumstances, if any," 2 would justify a heightened
standard.1
13
Leatherman seems consistent with the Court's views on municipal lia-
bility. The Owen Court found no injustice in denying qualified immunity to
municipalities when it held that principles of fairness and loss-spreading
required municipal liability, and that such liability would not lead to unde-
sirable indecisiveness in policy-making. 14 This line of reasoning arguably
forbids heightened pleading standards from minimizing municipal liability.
A heightened standard would minimize liability by insuring that only a frac-
tion of suits filed actually would be tried. Because municipalities are sub-
ject to § 1983 liability, perhaps a heightened standard is no more necessary
to protect them from frivolous claims than for any other defendant." 5
However, the simplicity of the preceding argument may be misleading
because municipalities are not like any other defendant To hold a munici-
pality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege not only that a constitu-
tional deprivation occurred, but also that a municipal policy or custom
caused it." 6 A § 1983 plaintiff sometimes must engage in a great deal of
costly and disruptive discovery to substantiate a claim. Some courts conse-
quently have held that the policy reasons in favor of a heightened pleading
rule are even more compelling in an action against a municipality, given the
potential disruption to the government itself.'' As one court noted, "[Tihe
109. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
112. This Note concludes that the Federal Rules provide better solutions to the "explosion" of
§ 1983 litigation than the heightened pleading standard. See infra notes 162-72 and accompany-
ing text.
113. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
114. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654-56 (1980).
115. "Elemental notions of fairness dictate that one who causes a loss should bear the loss."
Id. at 654.
116. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
117. Blaze, supra note 80, at 956. Professor Blaze relates an excellent example of this line of
judicial reasoning:
[A] claim of municipal liability based on an alleged policy reflected by a pattern of
prior episodes will inevitably risk placing an entire police department on trial. Sweeping
discovery will be sought to unearth episodes in which allegedly similar unconstitutional
actions have been taken, and the trial will then require litigation of every episode occur-
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policy underlying the special pleading requirement in § 1983 claims is even
more pronounced when a local government is charged with a violation
under the statute. There is a public interest in protecting local government
files from overbroad and irrelevant inquiries." 118 A stricter pleading stan-
dard could conceivably operate as a "golden mean" between qualified im-
munity and no restriction on liability at all because it would provide less
protection than immunity (meritorious suits would, in theory, still proceed),
and still prevent frivolous claims. Thus, the Leatherman Court might have
chosen to accept a heightened pleading standard when a municipality is
named as a § 1983 defendant.
The policy goals of § 1983, however, outweigh the special considera-
tions due municipalities. In Owen,"' the Court discussed the fact that the
statute was enacted to provide a remedy against the abuse of state power
and was intended to deter future violations:
Moreover, § 1983 was intended not only to provide compensation
to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against
future constitutional deprivations, as well. The knowledge that a
municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct, whether
committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive for
officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their in-
tended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitu-
tional rights. Furthermore, the threat that damages might be
levied against the city may encourage those in a policymaking
position to institute internal rules and programs designed to mini-
mize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitu-
tional rights.'2 °
Both of these goals would be seriously compromised by the imposition of a
heightened pleading standard in cases involving municipalities. Because
individual officials would still enjoy "qualified immunity" from § 1983
claims, a heightened pleading standard would hamper a § 1983 plaintiffs
ring in the community that counsel believes can be shown to involve a similar constitu-
tional violation.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978) (imposing higher
pleading standard for cases involving municipal corporations)).
118. LaPlant v. Frazier, 564 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The LaPlant court em-
ployed a heightened pleading standard to dismiss a § 1983 claim against a police station and two
officers. Id.
119. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
120. Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted). Concerning the interest of curbing abuses of state
power, the Court wrote:
How "uniquely amiss" it would be, therefore, if the government itself----"the social or-
gan to which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, justice, fair and equal
treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for social conduct"--were permit-
ted to disavow liability for the injury it had begotten.
Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
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most effective remedy. The deterrent power of § 1983 would lose its force
if municipal officers knew that the vast majority of civil rights suits would
fail under a heightened standard. Indeed, the majority of such actions
would probably fail because most plaintiffs would not have enough evi-
dence to allege sufficiently the existence of a municipal policy or custom
prior to discovery. As one court stated:
We are at a loss as to how any plaintiff, including a civil rights
plaintiff, is supposed to allege with specificity prior to discovery
acts to which he or she personally was not exposed, but which
provide evidence necessary to sustain the plaintiff's claim, i.e.,
that there was an official policy or a de facto custom which vio-
lated the Constitution.1 21
In essence, a heightened pleading standard would place a civil rights
plaintiff in a vicious circle of pleading requirements: specific facts are
needed to get to the discovery stage, but the specific facts in question are
almost invariably under the defendant's control and thus can only be ob-
tained through discovery.' 22  Municipalities would therefore enjoy de facto
freedom from civil rights cases, despite the Court's interpretation that
§ 1983 should serve as a remedy and a deterrent to governmental depriva-
tions of federal rights.123 In a sense, the heightened pleading standard
achieves the same minimization of municipal liability that an extension of
qualified immunity would have-a result the Owen Court opposed.
Leatherman can be viewed as a decision that balances the interest in
minimizing municipal liability against the importance of allowing civil
rights claims to proceed. Interestingly enough, the opinion cited none of
these reasons to justify its holding but instead relied upon the spirit and
letter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court based its interpre-
tation of Rule 8(a)(2) on Conley v. Gibson,'24 and by doing so, the
Leatherman Court indicated that it took Rule 8(a)(2) at face value and that
no more would be required of a plaintiff except in the limited circumstances
provided for in Rule 9(b)."2
121. Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. II. 1982). The Means court
declined to impose a heightened standard on a § 1983 claim. Id. at 462. Instead, the court held
that "the teaching of the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson and the pleading concepts of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) are no less applicable to § 1983 actions than to any other lawsuit." Id. at 459
(citations omitted).
122. See Blaze, supra note 80, at 962-63. Justice Marshall raised this very concern in Siegert
v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1801 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 108.
123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
125. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. The best interpretation of what the Conley Court meant
by the passage quoted in Leatherman is probably found in Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assurance
Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940), one of the cases cited by the Conley Court to support its
holding. The Leimer court stated that a complaint would be deficient if it appeared that no valid
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Leatherman could therefore be read as a blanket prohibition on height-
ened pleading standards. The language of the opinion provides some evi-
dence of this, as Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded by stating that the only
way to require a greater degree of specificity in the pleadings would be to
amend the Federal Rules. "In the absence of such an amendment, federal
courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discov-
ery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later."'126 The
Court's treatment of Conley also suggests that the Court would not counte-
nance creative interpretation of the Rules.2 7 Finally, the Court read the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) as indicating that because the Rules
do not mention any other requirements for particularity, no others exist.12 8
Interpreting Leatherman as imposing a complete ban on heightened
pleading standards may, however, presume too much. The opinion care-
fully stated that the stricter standard is inappropriate in the context of
§ 1983 claims against municipalities, but the Court did not state that a
heightened standard would be inappropriate in all circumstances. 29 Per-
haps the most revealing aspect of the opinion with regard to its scope was
the Court's announcement that "[w]e thus have no occasion to consider
whether our qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened
pleading in cases involving individual government officials." 130 This state-
ment suggests that the Court was at least willing to consider the merits of a
heightened standard in another context and did not interpret its decision as
holding that heightened pleading standards apart from Rule 9(b) were inva-
lid per se.
Although Leatherman's ban on heightened standards may be consis-
tent with the Court's views on municipal liability, it is less clear how the
Court would rule on the applicability of the heightened standard in actions
involving immunity defenses. The Court's refusal to decide whether a
heightened standard could properly be applied to a claim involving a quali-
claim existed at all, but not if it had merely been insufficiently stated. Id. at 306; see also Win-
gate, supra note 80, at 680 (discussing Leimer).
126. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
127. "In Conley v. Gibson, we said in effect that the Rule meant what it said." Id. (citations
omitted).
128. Id. The Court stated, "[T]he Federal Rules do address in 9(b) the question of the need
for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated
actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Id.
129. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims
against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of
Rule 9(b)." Id. (emphasis added). It is unclear what the Chief Justice intended by this comment,
but it is possible that he would favor such an amendment to the Rules.
130. Id. at 1162.
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fled immunity defense invites speculation. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,13 1 the
Court indicated that special care should be taken in screening suits involv-
ing an immunity defense. 132 Harlow voiced strong disapproval of the liti-
gation of frivolous § 1983 actions and manifested its concern by doing
away with the "subjective" element of the qualified immunity standard, thus
making it easier for these suits to be dismissed before trial.' The Court
even went so far as to say that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice
to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens
of broad reaching discovery."'134 By eliminating the subjective nature of the
qualified immunity test, the Harlow Court clearly expressed concern that
the costs incurred by allowing extensive discovery against local govern-
ments would outweigh the benefits of allowing every § 1983 suit to pro-
ceed. The Court also found that advocating the summary dismissal of
frivolous suits would not hinder the overall operation of § 1983: "By defin-
ing the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we pro-
vide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of
unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a
test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's
acts." 35 Thus, the Court certainly is attuned to the interest in efficiently
dismissing frivolous civil rights suits-contrary to an overly broad interpre-
tation of Leatherman.
Following the lead of Harlow, the Fifth Circuit in Elliott136 adapted the
Court's rationale in a seemingly appropriate situation-one where a defense
of qualified immunity was involved.' 37 Acknowledging that Harlow came
down on the side of protecting officials from frivolous suits, Elliott em-
ployed a heightened pleading standard as the best means of accomplishing
that task.'38 This standard was struck down by Leatherman when it was
employed in a suit involving no defense of qualified immunity.' 39 Assum-
ing that the policy reasons for dismissing frivolous § 1983 suits articulated
in Harlow are still valid, the question then becomes whether the Elliott stan-
dard is allowed in a case similar to the one in which it originated. In other
words, would a heightened pleading standard correspond to what the
Harlow opinion called for in cases involving qualified immunity?
131. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
132. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
133. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 815-19.
134. Id. at 817-18.
135. Id. at 819.
136. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
137. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
138. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1478.
139. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
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The Harlow opinion indicated that the main tool for the removal of
frivolous § 1983 cases would be summary judgment motions under Rule
56(c):
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct,
as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid
excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of
many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary
judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the
currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly estab-
lished at the time an action occurred. 14°
The Elliott court clearly went beyond the use of summary judgment to dis-
pose of claims perceived as frivolous. The heightened standard, as its name
suggests, raised the requirements of Rule 8(a) for certain cases: "[W]e,
and other courts, have tightened the application of Rule 8 when the very
nature of the litigation compels it. In the now familiar cases involving 42
U.S.C. § 1983 we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts,
not merely conclusory allegations."'' It is doubtful that the Harlow Court
would have condoned a heightened standard even when qualified immunity
was involved because it only spoke in terms of summary judgment.
Leatherman also referred to summary judgment as the preferred method of
disposing of meritless cases.' 42 Therefore, a heightened pleading standard
appears to be too drastic a procedural measure even when the immunity
doctrine is involved.
Use of a heightened pleading standard may be impermissible in quali-
fied immunity cases because even the significant interest in limiting expo-
sure to § 1983 suits does not merit cursory dismissal. Although the Court
has accorded great importance to protecting officials from liability, it is
difficult to see how a heightened standard could be justified under the rea-
sons given for "qualified immunity." First, a heightened standard would
not significantly aid in the prevention of "'the injustice... of subjecting to
liability an officer who is required ... to exercise discretion.""' This end
seems to be adequately served by requiring strict adherence to Harlow's
admonition that the availability of an immunity defense be a threshold ques-
tion, with no discovery being awarded until a violation of a recognized right
has been proven.'" In Siegert v. Gilley 45 the Court took this approach and
140. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
141. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479.
142. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
143. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974)).
144. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
145. 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
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held that the court below did not need to dismiss a § 1983 claim by the use
of a heightened standard:
We think the Court of Appeals should not have assumed without
deciding this preliminary issue in this case, and proceeded to ex-
amine the sufficiency of the allegations of malice. In Harlow we
said that "[u]ntil this threshold immunity question is resolved,
discovery should not be allowed." A necessary concomitant to
the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a
plaintiff is "clearly established" at the time the defendant acted is
the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation
of a constitutional right at all. Decision of this purely legal ques-
tion permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the
test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified
immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation
to defend the suit on its merits. 146
This approach has two virtues. It protects the defendant from personal lia-
bility and guards against the threat of having to defend against meritless
suits.147 First, unlike the heightened standard, the Siegert approach also
accomplishes all of the purposes of the immunity doctrine without violating
the spirit of the Rules. The Siegert approach merely calls for courts to
ensure that all the elements in the cause of action have been pleaded, and
not to award discovery until this occurs.'14  The paradox of the heightened
pleading standard is avoided because the court bases its decision on a
purely legal question and not on the plaintiff's ability to allege facts that are
as yet unknown.
Second, a heightened pleading standard, far more than "qualified im-
munity," unnecessarily deters liability to the extent that an official might be
encouraged to disregard violations of constitutional rights in the exercise of
his duties. 49 "Qualified immunity" only prevents the personal liability of
officials, whereas a heightened standard would decrease the total number of
146. Id. at 1793 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
147. "One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only
unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long
drawn out lawsuit." Id.
148. In effect, the majority opinion of Siegert strips the heightened pleading standard of one of
its main bases of support: Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the same opinion. Justice Kennedy
maintained that the court of appeals properly used a heightened pleading standard to dismiss the
claim by virtue of holding the plaintiff's allegations of malice insufficient. Id. at 1795 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Malice was required to avoid the suit being barred by qualified immunity. Justice
Kennedy opined that a court should look to the arguably simpler task of determining the suffi-
ciency of the malice claim before moving on to the constitutional question of whether a violation
of a clearly established constitutional or federal right had been established. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. Although this view has merit, it is at
odds with the Court's distaste for the heightened requirement voiced in Leatherman.
149. The two "mutually dependent rationales" that form the basis of the doctrine of immunity
are:
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§ 1983 suits because plaintiffs would be halted before they gained enough
access to the facts to discover whether an official actually had deprived
them of their rights. This distinction is significant because the extension of
qualified immunity was not intended to cause the courts to turn a blind eye
on official misbehavior. Imposition of a heightened pleading standard
therefore would go beyond the purpose of the immunity doctrine and allow
judicial investigation of constitutional violations to be dropped prematurely.
In addition, even if the fear of personal liability might deter citizens
from holding public office, it is an insufficient reason for imposing a stricter
pleading standard.150 Because the removal of the threat of personal liability
would seemingly end this concern, extension of qualified immunity is an
adequate remedy. A heightened standard does not end the threat of per-
sonal liability, it only makes it harder for such claims to get into court.
The reactions of the lower federal courts to Leatherman have been
varied and provide little guidance as to the true scope of the decision. Some
of the district courts apparently interpret the decision as holding that no
pleading standard beyond the requirements of Rule 8(a) is permissible in
any type of civil rights case. For example, in Gibson v. Adult Proba-
tion-Parole Department of Montgomery County, 5' a federal district court
cited Leatherman for the following proposition:
While this court in the recent past has required a modicum of
factual specificity in civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, this is no longer the rule. A federal court may not
apply a heightened pleading requirement in a civil rights action
that is more stringent than the normal pleading requirements of
Rule 8(a).15 2
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion;
(2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his
office with the decisiveness and the judgement [sic] required by the public good.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1979) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 240 (1974)). Neither of these rationales necessarily require that all claims alleging official
wrongdoing be cut off early in the pleading stages. It is arguable that the possibility of a suit
against a public official would provide a healthy deterrent to the possible misuse of power, even
though the doctrine of qualified immunity would probably limit possible remedies to injunctions.
See id. at 657 n.41 (explaining how threat of government liability is a "wholesome deterrent" to
irresponsible acts by government employees).
150. Id. at n.38 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)).
151. Gibson v. Adult Probation-Parole Dep't of Montgomery County, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11427 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
152. Id. at *2-*3 (citing Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163).
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Similarly, another federal district court interpreted Leatherman as holding
that "[u]nless otherwise provided by Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, facts need not be set out with particularity."
1 53
A few courts have used the reasoning in Leatherman to strike down
heightened standards in contexts other than § 1983 actions. For example,
Pape v. Great Lakes Chemical Co. 154 involved a claim under a federal envi-
ronmental statute. 155 Although the defendants argued that a heightened
pleading standard should be applied to the complaint, the court refused,
reasoning that "[t]he Supreme Court... has noted that Federal Rule 9(b)
provides only two exceptions to notice pleading .... The Court has held
that any other exceptions 'must be obtained by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.'" 156 Courts in other dis-
tricts have also refused to extend heightened pleading standards to other
areas.157 Apparently, Leatherman has eradicated heightened standards in
several districts, thereby indicating a trend among courts to interpret
Leatherman as a blanket prohibition on all pleading standards not explicitly
authorized by the Rules.
Not all district courts, however, have interpreted Leatherman so
broadly. Some have declined to read Leatherman as holding anything more
than that heightened pleading standards are inappropriate in § 1983 actions
153. Carney v. Fairman, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11289, *3 (N.D. 11. 1993) (citing
Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163). The decision continued:
Hossman's statement of the pleading standards governing section 1983 claims has been
implicitly overruled by Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordi-
nation Unit, which held that courts may not impose heightened pleading requirements in
section 1983 actions. Leatherman struck down the Fifth Circuit's requirement that sec-
tion 1983 plaintiffs plead their actions with factual detail and particularity. Leatherman
squarely held that section 1983 plaintiffs need only satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)'s
requirement of "a short and plain statement of the claim."
Id. at *7 (citations omitted) (discussing Hossman v. Blunk, 784 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1986)).
154. No. 93-C-1585, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14674 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1993).
155. The suit was brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act, or CERCLA, which provides for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
allows violators to seek contribution from one another. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
156. Pape, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14674 at *20 n.5 (citing Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163);
see also Warwick Admin. Group v. Avon Prods., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("While there appears to be some case law support for requiring a heightened pleading standard,
we find that the Leatherman reason applies with equal force here,").
157. See, e.g., Garus v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13328 (N.D. Ind.
1993). The Garus court applied Leatherman to invalidate a heightened pleading requirement in
actions involving Title VII claims:
Although Leatherman concerned the narrow question of § 1983 complaints against mu-
nicipal corporations, its reasoning in this regard applies equally to Title VII actions,
such as the one here: had the rules foreseen heightened pleading requirements for such
actions, they would have so provided-they did not. Accordingly, the court concludes
that no heightened particularity is required in pleading Title VII claims.
Id. at *11 (citations omitted).
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against municipalities. For example, in Luedke v. Pan Am Corp., the fed-
eral district court for the southern district of New York heard a § 1983
claim involving a qualified immunity defense alleged by a government ap-
pointed official. 5 ' The court declared that Leatherman "explicitly left
open the question of whether our qualified immunity jurisprudence would
require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual government of-
ficials."' 59 The opinion went on to state, however, that because of the
Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize any type of heightened standard in
Leatherman, such standards should probably only apply in rare instances
involving important officials:
Even if a heightened pleading standard is required in actions
brought against officials performing core governmental functions,
the Supreme Court's expressed preference in Leatherman for lim-
iting stringent pleading requirements to situations contemplated
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that the height-
ened standard is unlikely to be extended to actions brought
against persons, such as the Committee and its members, ap-
pointed by government officials to look after their own private
interests and the interests of those similarly situated. 6 °
Thus, Luedke illustrates the ambiguity that the district courts attach to
Leatherman's holding and the extent to which district court judges are
forced to speculate on how the Court would address a case involving the
immunity doctrine.' 6 '
The decline of the use of heightened pleading standards should be
viewed favorably by all concerned because the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provide an accurate way of sifting through claims while conserving
judicial resources. A motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule
56,162 is arguably better suited to disposing of frivolous claims than a
heightened pleading standard. The Supreme Court itself has expressed an
affinity for the use of Rule 56 to dispose of cases on several occasions.' 63
158. 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11598 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
159. Id. at *20.
160. Id. at *21. It is unclear whether the court contemplated a two-tiered structure of officials
based on the importance of their duties, with a heightened standard available to one but not the
other.
161. Another case involving a public official who claimed an immunity defense is Kimberlin
v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in which the court held that Leatherman did not apply.
"[Blecause the [Leatherman] Court did not address heightened pleading in individual capacity
suits, our precedent requiring that standard in such suits remains the governing law of this circuit."
Id. at 794; see also McDonald v. City of Freeport, 834 F. Supp. 921, 929 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (hold-
ing the heightened standard applicable to suits against individual officials).
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
163. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the Court said:
Before the shift to "notice pleading" accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to
dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which factually
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The Leatherman Court expressly mentioned that summary judgment is one
of the procedures that federal courts have to rely on in lieu of a heightened
standard, further supporting the idea that summary judgment is the pre-
ferred manner to screen cases. 16 Proper use of Rule 56 would provide a
more accurate method of screening out meritless cases while still conserv-
ing judicial resources. Summary judgment motions would dispose of
claims based on a review of their merits, whereas the heightened standard
merely focuses on the degree to which the plaintiff can plead with particu-
larity. Dismissal under Rule 56, at a minimum, offers a plaintiff a chance to
present the merits of a claim, whereas a chance to amend a complaint before
dismissal under a heightened standard only presents a plaintiff with the vain
task of alleging with particularity facts that may not be known or obtainable
at the time.165
Because a defendant may make a motion for summary judgment at the
commencement of a suit, a plaintiff could be placed in the same situation
presented by the heightened standard-i.e., compelled to allege facts that
are as yet unknown. Rule 56(f), however, gives a court the means to allow
the plaintiff to discover the existence of any necessary elements of the
claim. 166 After postponing a summary judgment decision under 56(f), a
court could allow sufficient discovery to determine the merits of the
insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial with
the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources. But with the
advent of "notice pleading," the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any
more, and its place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 327. See generally Marcy J. Levine, Comment, Summary Judgment: The Majority View
Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY L. J. 171 passim (1988)
(reviewing the Court's pro-summary judgment jurisprudence in the 1986 session); Martin B.
Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Plead-
ing, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67
N.C. L. R v. 1023, 1041-52 (1989) (discussing the effects of Celotex). For a criticism of the
Court's efforts to make summary judgment a more effective way of dismissing cases, see Melissa
L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASliNoS
LJ. 53 passim (1988).
164. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
165. Some courts have utilized this type of limited discovery in claims involving the immunity
doctrine. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1053 (9th Cir. 1988).
166. Rule 56(f) reads:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f). The Leatherman plaintiffs argued in district court that summary judgment
should not be awarded because they had not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery pursuant
to Rule 56(f). Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 755 F. Supp. 726, 734 (1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1054
(5th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). The court was unsympathetic to this request,
noting that "[t]his suit was filed in December 1989, and plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to
engage in full discovery since then." Id.
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claim. 67 The discovery granted need not have the same debilitating effects
that summary judgment seeks to avoid. First, a plaintiff is not automati-
cally entitled to a Rule 56(f) motion. 6' The plaintiff must convince the
court that the information sought could not have been obtained earlier and
that the requested discovery is likely to unearth sufficient facts to defeat the
summary judgment motion. A defendant could then serve depositions on
the plaintiff to discover any deficiencies of the plaintiff's allegations on the
immunity question, and successfully move for summary judgment if the
allegations are insufficient. In this way, Rule 56(f) would allow courts to
tailor discovery to the minimum amount necessary to determine the merits
of a claim.
Rule 11 is also frequently used to discourage frivolous suits and could
be employed by courts to fulfill many of the same functions as a heightened
pleading standard while remaining within the Rules' authority. Rule 11
states that the signature of an attorney or party on a pleading attests that the
pleading is made in good faith and is not frivolous.' 6 9 The Rule also pro-
vides that "an appropriate sanction" is available if the party or attorney fails
to meet the obligation thereby imposed.' 7 ' Judicious use of Rule 11 could
conceivably deter meritless § 1983 suits to the point that courts would be
more inclined to hear the merits of § 1983 suits brought despite the threat of
Rule 11 sanctions. If Rule 11 sanctions are used too frequently, however,
there is a potential for a "chilling effect" on § 1983 suits that could prevent
the submission of many justified actions.' 7' The use of Rule 11 as a substi-
tute for the heightened standard therefore would need to be combined with
an overall examination of the factual basis of the claim, especially when, as
167. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 86 COLUM. L. Rnv. 433, 484-91 (1986). Professor Marcus provides an excellent discus-
sion of how Rule 56(f) provides courts with a far more precise tool than a heightened pleading
standard.
168. The Rule states that a court "may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained... or may make such other order as is just." FED.
R. Cv. P. 56(f) (emphasis added). The broad discretion accorded by the Rule allows courts to
tailor the amount of discovery awarded to the circumstances of the case.
169. The relevant portion of Rule 11 reads:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;, that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
170. Id.
171. See Blaze, supra note 80, at 988.
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in most civil rights claims, many material facts were in the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant at the commencement of the suit. 172
Although the Leatherman decision expressly avoided the question of
whether a heightened standard of pleading could be applied in a situation
involving immunity concerns, the Court probably has turned its back on the
dubious merits of a heightened standard. The Supreme Court, by holding
the standard invalid on the basis of the Rules only-rather than on policy
grounds-implied that any standard outside the authority of the Rules is
invalid. It is also arguable on policy grounds that courts should not resort to
a heightened standard even in cases involving immunity defenses when
there is a compelling incentive to prevent frivolous suits. The careful appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under the directive of
Leatherman, can provide a fairer means of disposing of plaintiff's § 1983
claims while still adequately protecting the government's interest.
ERIC HARBROOK CO'rTRLL
172. See id. Many § 1983 suits could conceivably be filed in good faith after a "reasonable
inquiry," even when undisclosed facts held by the defendant would clearly reveal that the suit was
groundless. To prevent unnecessary deterrence of § 1983 claims, courts might need to employ a
looser definition of Rule I I's "reasonable inquiry" in recognition of the special problems faced by
§ 1983 plaintiffs.
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